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India's Evolving Patent
Laws and
WTO Obligations:
The Rejection of Abbott
Laboratories'
Application for a New
Kaletra Patent
Adam Chilton
Introduction
On December 30, 2010, India's pat-
ent office in Mumbai rejected the
Chicago-based pharmaceutical com-
pany Abbott Laboratories' applica-
tion for a patent on a new version
of Kaletra.1 Kaletra is a second-line
antiretroviral HIV/AIDS drug that is
a combination of lopinavir and rito-
navir, and is widely considered the
best treatment for patients who are
resistant to the first-line medicines. 2
After a process that took nearly
four years, Abbott's patent applica-
tion was rejected because the ver-
sion of Kaletra under consideration
was deemed not to be an "inventive
step" beyond previous lopinavir/rito-
navir combinations that are already
under patent.3 Although this may
sound like a routine patent rejec-
tion, civil society groups like Doctors
Without Borders have already hailed
the decision as "a major victory for
public health" because of its poten-
tial to make generic drugs available
in the developing world by prevent-
ing pharmaceutical companies from
extending patents on products that
are only improvements on existing
treatments.4 Pharmaceutical compa-
nies and intellectual property advo-
cates have been quick to point out,
however, that the decision is just the
latest sign that India is not comply-
ing with its obligations under the
World Trade Organization's (WTO)
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellec-
tual Property Rights (TRIPS) Agree-
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ment.5 Under the TRIPS agreement,
counties are required to, at a mini-
mum, provide protection for prod-
ucts when a product contains an
"inventive step," but the agreement
only clarifies that the term may be
considered synonymous with "non-
obvious" and intentionally leaves the
standard vague to allow for flexibility
in domestic laws.6 Given that ambi-
guity, this decision will likely spark a
debate on whether India is ignoring
its commitments or exercising appro-
priate discretion. That debate may
have wide-ranging consequences for
both access to medicine and the pro-
tection of intellectual property in the
developing world.
The Evolution of India's
Patent Laws
India's patent regime has undergone
a series of major transformations over
the second half of the 20th century
that, taken together, have produced
the current clashes between multina-
tional pharmaceutical companies and
domestic generic manufactures over
intellectual property.7 Although India
gained independence from Great
Britain in 1947, it took over 20 years
before the country was able to enact
its own patent law." Perhaps the most
notable feature of this first law, "The
Patent Act of 1970," is that it removed
the "patentability of pharmaceutical
products."9 As a result, pharmaceuti-
cal companies were unable to receive
patent protection over the actual
compounds and drugs they devel-
oped. It was still possible, however,
to receive a patent for the process of
making a substance, but only then
for a relatively short maximum time
of seven years from the date of the
patent. 0
The impact of India's lax patent
laws was the development of a thriv-
ing generic drug-manufacturing sec-
tor." Indian companies were able to
reverse engineer medicines developed
in other countries, and then produce
the same substances through differ-
ent processes while still receiving full
protection of the law. These legal pro-
tections resulted in the emergence
of major generic firms like Ranbaxy
and Cipla and the construction of
more U.S. Food and Drug Admin-
istration-approved manufacturing
centers than any country outside of
the United States.12 This has not only
allowed India to provide access to
cheap medicine to its own citizens,
but also enabled India to become so
prolific as a drug exporter that it is
often referred to as "the pharmacy to
the world' 3
India's patent laws began to evolve
when the country became an original
member of the WTO in 1995.) As a
condition of membership, India was
required to bring its domestic intel-
lectual property laws into compliance
with international standards that
were elaborated as part of the TRIPS
agreement. Since India had not pre-
viously extended patents to phar-
maceutical products, as part of the
agreement it was allowed a 10-year
grace period to fully incorporate
the international agreement into its
domestic patent regime."5 The result
was a three-stage process for amend-
ing the Patent Act of 1970, ultimately
culminating in the Patent (Amend-
ment) Act of 2005, which finally put
pharmaceutical patent protection
into full effect.16
Despite the increased protection for
intellectual property that the reforms
provide, many limits were included
within the amended patent laws to
ensure "the availability and access of
medicines."'17 These limits included
only allowing patents to be granted
for applications that were filed after
1995, and any Indian generic manu-
facturer, which began to produce
a drug before 2005, to continue to
produce that product.'8 Additionally,
Section 3(d) of the new amended pat-
ent law was included with the hope of
only allowing protection for innova-
tive products that are not derivative of
other substances, and the act defined
an "inventive step" as "a feature of
an invention that involves technical
advance as compared to the exist-
ing knowledge or having economic
significance or both and that makes
the invention not obvious to a person
skilled in the art."9 These provisions
were designed to take advantage of
the flexibility allowed by the TRIPS
agreement, but it has remained an
open question whether India would
interpret the requirements in a way
that was consistent with the under-
standing of other signatories of the
TRIPS agreements.20 This was the
backdrop against which Abbott Lab-
oratories filed its patent application
in India.
Background on Abbott's
Application
In 1992, Abbott was awarded its first
patent in the United States for the
drug Ritonavir.21 Ritonavir is an anti-
retroviral drug that was developed
to treat HIV/AIDS. Ritonavir was
later combined with another drug,
Lopinavir, developed by Abbott; the
combination is marketed as Kale-
tra. Since its emergence in the world
marketplace, the WHO has identi-
fied Kaletra as a preferred second-
line treatment to fight drug-resistant
HIV/AIDS, and recommended its
inclusion by governments on their
lists of essential drugs.22 As a result,
Kaletra is an essential part of the
battle against the global HIV/AIDS
epidemic.
On March 24, 2006, Abbott filed a
patent application for a new version
of Kaletra in India.2 Abbott had pre-
viously filed a patent application for a
soft-gel formulation of the drug, but
ultimately withdrew the application
after it faced opposition during the
pre-grant review process.24 The new
application was an attempt to patent
a "solid pharmaceutical dosage form"
of Kaletra.25 Abbott argued that this
represented a substantial improve-
ment over the previously marketed
soft-gel tablets. Specifically, Abbott
argued that the new solid dosage
form of Kaletra made the drug more
heat resistant and that it could now
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be taken solely with water.26 Since the
previous version of the drug required
refrigeration and had to be taken
with food, Abbott was able to argue
that this presented a potentially criti-
cal advancement of special signifi-
cance to those battling drug-resistant
forms of HIV/AIDS in the developing
world.
Despite Abbott's claimed innova-
tions, the patent application faced
substantial objections. In addition
to complaints from health advocacy
a known substance, and that the pro-
cess to convert the soft-gel tablets to
a solid dosage form was already well
known.32
The Decision
After nearly four years of proceed-
ings, India's patent office in Mumbai
released an opinion rejecting Abbott
Laboratories' application to patent a
"solid pharmaceutical dosage" form of
Kaletra.3 3 The decision by Dr. Ruchi
Tiwari, Deputy Controller of Patents
of suitable surfactants' which means
that it "cannot be a mere admixture...
[and]...be held as not patentable
as per provisions of section 3(e)" of
the amended Patents Act.35 In these
two concessions, the decision made
it clear that it was not using either
of the two sections in India's new
domestic patent regime that were
designed to limit the extension of
patents to minor improvements on
existing pharmaceutical products.
Instead, the decision directly con-
The decision by the Indian Patent Office in Mumbai to reject Abbott
Laboratories' application to patent a new solid dosage form of Kaletra
highlights the fact that the TRIPS agreement did not end the tug of war
between groups hoping to increase access to life-saving medications in
the developing world and those seeking to provide robust protection to
intellectual property to ensure that incentives exist to guarantee the continued
development of innovative treatments for diseases. As a result, it remains to be
determined whether the long-term impact of this decision will be to increase
the availability of generic drugs, or alternatively, to reign in the existing
discretion that allows nations to define what constitutes an "inventive step"
when reviewing pharmaceutical patent applications.
groups like Doctors Without Bor-
ders,27 four organizations filed for-
mal opposition.28 Three of the official
opponents were the generic manu-
facturers Cipla, Okasa, and Matrix. 29
The fourth opponent, the Initiative
for Medicines, Access & Knowledge
(I-MAK), was a U.S.-based non-
profit.3 0 I-MAK is a group of doctors
and lawyers that has waged an inter-
national campaign to increase access
to affordable medicines by limiting
what it views as abuses of the patent
system by large multinational corpo-
rations.3' Given its importance in the
fight against HIV/AIDS, I-MAK has
made increasing access to generic
versions of Kaletra a top priority. As
a result, I-MAK made two official
filings in opposition to Abbott's pat-
ent application, arguing that the new
form of Kaletra was a modification of
and Designs, begins by repeating
the history of the filings by Abbott
and the four official opponents to
the applications. The decision then
proceeds to recount the amended 22
claims on file from Abbott, and then
document the arguments and exhib-
its of the four opponents.
The decision employs an interest-
ing argument discussing the mer-
its. The decision agrees with Abbott
Laboratories that the new version of
Kaletra is "not a mere discovery of a
new form of a known substance."34
As a consequence, the decision finds
that the product "cannot be held as
not patentable under the provisions
of Section 3(d) of the amended Pat-
ents Act." The decision proceeds to
again agree with Abbott Laborato-
ries that in the new version of Kale-
tra "the invention lies in the selection
298
sidered whether the patent consti-
tutes an "inventive step" over previ-
ous products.3 6 In this analysis, the
decision only considered two exhibits
presented by the opponents of the
patent application. The first exhibit
was a document that discussed the
value and procedure of turning soft-
gel forms of HIV inhibitors into a
solid dosage through a process that
may require the use of a suitable
surfactant. The second exhibit was a
document that explored the process
of selecting a suitable surfactant to
create a solid dosage form of a drug.
Based on these two exhibits, the deci-
sion concluded that the process "for
preparing the solid dispersion formu-
lations [of Kaletra] can be achieved
through routine experimentation by
combining the disclosures of [the
first document] with the disclosure of
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[the second document] ."7 As a result,
without discussing the exact standard
required by either the Indian Pat-
ent Act or the TRIPS agreement, the
decision rejected Abbott's application
to patent the new version of Kaletra
because the product's innovations
"clearly do not involve [an] inventive
step."3'
Potential Impact
There are at least four potential
impacts that may result from India's
decision to reject Abbott's applica-
tion. First, the most immediate rami-
fication of the decision may be to
increase access to the drug for people
living with HIV and AIDS in the
developing world. The leading oppo-
nent to Abbott's application, I-MAK,
has already claimed that the impact
of the case will be "tremendous." 3 9
I-MAK argues that there are over 33
million individuals living with HIV,
and 15 million of them require access
to HIV drugs. According to I-MAK's
calculations, the cost savings from
introducing generic versions of Kale-
tra that can now be legally produced
and importedby Indian manufactures
are sufficient to make the treatment
available to 130,000 new patients a
year. This sentiment has been echoed
by Doctors Without Borders 40 and
the Health Global Access Project.4'
Second, the decision has the poten-
tial to set a precedent in which mul-
tinational pharmaceutical corpora-
tions are held to a higher standard
when seeking to gain new patents for
improvements on existing innova-
tions in India than in other countries
party to the TRIPS agreement. In the
first month following the rejection of
Abbott's application for a new Kale-
tra patent on December 30, 2010, at
least five major patents were rejected
or revoked on similar grounds.4 2
Analysts have argued that this is part
of a trend in India of favoring process
over product when evaluating pat-
ent applications, and that applying
new process to improve upon exist-
ing products will be increasingly less
likely to receive protection. Given
India's large domestic market and
generic drug industry, this shift has
the potential to make it even more
difficult for U.S.- and European-
based pharmaceutical companies to
compete in the developing market.
Third, the decision has the poten-
tial to change the behavior of Abbott
and other multinational pharmaceu-
tical companies. After being denied a
patent in 2006, Novartis claimed that
there is "no faster way to kill access to
the latest life-saving drugs for people
in India than to avoid offering pat-
ent protection."4 This proved to be
true in Thailand, where in 2007 the
Ministry of Public Health decided to
issue a compulsory license on Kaletra
to allow the import of generic drugs
from India.44 Abbott's response was
to reduce the price for Kaletra in 40
countries, but also to withdraw regis-
tration for all new products in Thai-
land. A similar response may occur in
India if multinational pharmaceuti-
cal companies feel that they are not
being provided with adequate protec-
tion for their intellectual property.
This may lead to a lag between when
drugs are available in Western mar-
kets, and when patients in the devel-
oping world are able to benefit from
new pharmaceutical innovations.
Fourth, the decision will lead to
an increase in claims that India's
domestic patent regime falls short
of its obligations under the WTO's
TRIPS agreement.45 Since Europe
has already signaled its intention to
extend patent protection to the new
solid dosage form of Kaletra, this case
only highlights the drift between the
protections being afforded multina-
tional corporations in the West and
in India.46 The Office of the United
States Trade Representative (USTR)
had already placed India on its prior-
ity watch list as a result of its actions
"to limit the patentability of poten-
tially beneficial innovations, such as
temperature-stable forms of a drug
or new means of drug delivery."47
Since this decision took exactly that
course of action, it is likely that India
will face increased pressure to either
clarify or amend their existing patent
laws to be most consistent with the
United States' interpretation of the
TRIPS agreement.
Conclusion
The decision by the Indian Patent
Office in Mumbai to reject Abbott
Laboratories' application to patent
a new solid dosage form of Kaletra
highlights the fact that the TRIPS
agreement did not end the tug of war
between groups hoping to increase
access to life-saving medications in
the developing world and those seek-
ing to provide robust protection to
intellectual property to ensure that
incentives exist to guarantee the con-
tinued development of innovative
treatments for diseases. As a result,
it remains to be determined whether
the long-term impact of this deci-
sion will be to increase the availabil-
ity of generic drugs, or alternatively,
to reign in the existing discretion
that allows nations to define what
constitutes an "inventive step" when
reviewing pharmaceutical patent
applications.
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